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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that different degrees of regulation affect electric
utility firm's operating and financial strategies.
The analysis also provides a potential approach for testing the Averch-
Johnson effect using financial information which has been neglected until
this time.

SOME EFFECTS OF ITILITY REGULATION
ON FIRM OPERATING AM) FINANCIAL STRATEGIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it is important to examine the effect of utility regulation on the
financial behavior of firms, one important avenue of inquiry has remained unex-
plored. That is, regulation is not a homogeneous commodity and all regulated
firms are not subjected to the same dtigree of regulation. This condition raises
an important question. That is, if rtigulation differs according to the type of
regulatory regime faced by the firm, how does each firm adjust its capital struc-
ture and operating strategy so as to minimize the adverse impact of that regulation
on the fiinn's performance. That inquj.ry is the main purpose of this study; that
is, do differences in regulatory regimes faced by regulated firms affect the
firm's capital structure and operating strategy?
The pla.i of this paper is as folloT;s. In the second section, previous
studies are reviewed. In the third section, the theoretical base for this paper
is developed. The fourth section pressents empirical studies developed to test the
relevant hypotheses. Finally, the resjuD.ts of this paper and conclusions are sum-
marized.
II. PRF/IOUS STUDIES
The landmark study by Modigliani ard Miller (M & M) (1958) examined electric
utility firms and discussed risk class cf securities caused by the variability of
earnings streams. The original M & M study as well as Modigliani and Miller's (1963
1965 and 1966) subsequent studies do not examine the effect of type of regula-
tory regime on the risk clcsc of securities.
Boness and Frankfurter (1977) ar<;' somewhat critical of M & M and question
whether risk class should be associated with industry. They examine what they
term "the believed- co-be most homogeneous of industries, electric utilities."
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They conclude that the results of their tests are convinvlngly at variance with
the notion that the electric utility industry is a homogeneous population. They
conclude
:
Simply the M & M choice, as that of many others' using the
definition of electric utilities (or any other "industry"
for that matter) as a surrogate for risk class, was a poor
choice.
Hite (1977) theoretically investigated the relationship among leverage, out-
put effects and the M & M theorems. He argued that output, investment and financing
decisions must be optimized simultaneously. While the Hite study is interesting,
it does not explicitly address the questions of how operating decisions and oper-
ating strategy are affected by utility regulation.
In another landmark study, Eiteman (1962) examined the permitted and earned
rates of return of fifteen Bell Telephone companies in the 1950-1959 period.
Eiteman found that "...actual rates of return to book value of securites (that is,
to original cost)... have been highest for companies in the reproduction-cost
jurisdictions and lowest for the companies in the original-cost jurisdictions.
Pike (1967), using electric utility data for 1961-1963 found a mean rate of
return of 6.38 percent on net plant in original cost jurisdicitons and 6.63 percent
where other valuation methods were used,
Petersen (1976) found that the allowed rates of return and the realized rates
of return were higher for fair value firms than those in original cost jurisdictions.
The last three studies recognize that different types of regulation may cause
differences in earnings streams; yet, this possibility was ignored by the M & M
and Boness and Frankfurter studies. Moreover, although the latter studies do
recognize the effect of different degrees of regulation on the earnings stream,
these studies do not examine the effect of the different regulatory regimes on
the risk class, the adjustments made to capital structure, and operating strategy
as firms attempt to neutralize or offset the effect of utility regulation on their
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earnings. Moreover, these different regulatory effects will obviously affect the
homogeneity of a sample of electric utility firms.
III. THE THEORY
The rate base is defined as the gross valuation of public utility property,
less depreciation. In electric utility rate making, the rate base is considered
an important variable because it is at the core of the rate determination process.
The state regulatory commission must also establish a rate of return allowable on'.
the rate base; then that rate is applied to the rate base to determine the return
amount which the utility may earn. Then, the specific rate schedules for the
utility must be constructed. This indicates, therefore, that both the rate base
and the rate of return affect the return amount which the utility earns from
selling its services. The rate base is determined on the basis of orignlal cost,
fair value, or reproduction cost depending upon the state In which the firm is
situated. State law prescribes which method is to be used in a given state.
There is a distinct difference between original cost, fair value, and repro-
duction cost methods of determining the rate base. Garfield and Lovejoy (1964,
p. 60) explain that in the original cost method the property Is valued at its
cost when it was first used in a public utility application. The procedure Is
historical, in a sense, because the current market valuation of the equipment is
irrelevant to its value for rate making.
Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p. 59) explain that in fair value valuation of
a rate base the value is determined by considering- three factors: "(a) The actual
cost of the property; (b) the present value of construction...; and (c) other
matters generally taken to represent various intangibles." This technique clearly
provides for a consideration of the current cost of equipment in determining the
value of a rate base for rate making purpose.
The reproduction cost new less depreciation rate base method of valuation
Involves "...the cost of duplicating the existing plant at recent or present prices.
>. .no aeoi-
niu.= «!-r aiii ati
i.i) V„
{ J<i<jC
n;tmq):up
;(. irjHl! Vn
'' t r^u' ^ri'3 ""J.!"f'*' Jr"^fi!C9
n3a.<..ji njyj
m/'i>
.jj < Q
4.
less depreciation." Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, p. 63). This procedure in-
volves a consideration of construction costs and price level adjustments. This
approach, therefore, considers changes in the value of money.
There are arguments advanced for and against the use of each of these three
methods of rate base valuation, see Garfield and Lovejoy (1964, pp. 58-65). The
facts remain, however, that one of these methods is used in each state regulatory
jurisdiction. It is obvious (from footnote 1) that each of these three methods
of rate base deterinination will permit the firm to generate a different earnings
streams or revenue requirement. Realized rates of return should be highest for
reproduction cost jurisdictions and lowest for firms in original cost jurisdictions.
Firms in fair value jurisdictions should generate rates of return in between
original cost and reproduction costs.
^
The different rates of return caused by different rate base methods causes
different earnings streams and consequently affects the risk class of securities.^
Actually, a different level of business risk is caused by the different regulatory
regimes because of the different earnings streams.
In Figure 1, curves I, II, and III represent the relationship between earnings
on equity and risks to stockholders for the different regulatory regimes. Curve I
represents the highest level of business risk and III the lowest; therefore, since
original cost regulation yields lower rates of return, I represents that regime.
Since reproduction cost regulation yields the highest returns, III represents
that regime and II represents fair value which yields intermediate level of re-
turns. The same level of business risk is associated with any point along a
given curve, but as mentioned before, I represents higher business risk than II, etc.
The firms controlled by fair value and reproduction cost regimes enjoy
decreased riskiness (business risk) which allow them to increase their debt (and
thus increase return on equity), without increasing total risk to stockholders
(see Figure 1, b, f and d) . Thus, the fair value and reproduction cost firms are
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advantaged and have earnings risk curves somewhat like II and III in Figure I.
If one compares the three curves at the same debt level, that is, points b,
b', and b", the financial risks associated with the same debt will be the same for
the three regulatory regimes, but as mentioned earlier the business risk will be
lower for the II and III curve. Consequently, the total risk to stockholders of firms
operating in those regulatory regimes will be lower. Moreover, the earnings in
the fair value and reproduction cost regimes will be higher because of their
favored treatment by regulators and because of their lower cost of capital.
Since b, b', and b" all represent the same debt levels, it is obvious that
firms regulated by fair value and reproduction cost regimes are able to increase
their debt level more readily than those in the original cost regimes. Moreover,
there are good economic reasons why such adjustments should be made. Consequently,
the differences in regulatory regimes causes electric utility firms to modify their
capital structures. In addition, it is also possible for utility firms to change
their operating strategy to react to different regulation regimes. In the following
section data from fifty-nine electric utility firms are used to develop some
empirical studies which examine the effect of regulation on operating strategy and
the effect of regulation on capital structure.
IV. EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Data from fifty-nine electric utility firms during 1958-1975 are used to
Investigate the effects of different regulatory regimes on the operating and fi-
nancial strategy of firms in the electric utility industry. The company list in
Appendix A shows that the sample consisted of 34 firms regulated by original
cost rates base jurisdictions; 19 firms regulated by a fair value rate base
jurisdiction, and 6 firms from reproduction cost rate base jurisdictions. The
sample was selected from the electric utility firms listed in the Compustat
utility tape. Firms operating in more than one state were eliminated
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because they were regulated by more than one regulatory regime. This procedure
avoided the joint effect on a single firm caused by different rate base methods
being used in different states. Holding companies were also excluded. Some
electric firms also sell natural gas; therefore, within the sample for each rate
base method, roughly the same proportion of firms sold both gas and electricity
as those selling only electricity. This approach was used to reduce the market
power problem caused when firms face no competition from substitute fuel when the
sell both gas and electricity in a single market. To reveal the dynamic nature
of the impact of different regulatory regimes, data for 18 years, 1958-1975, were
used in the analysis.
The impact of different regulation on the operating strategy of the electric
utility firms was evaluated by examining the degree of operating leverage. Fol-
lowing Hunt (1961), Mao (1969), and Weston and Brigham (1975) the degree of
operating leverage (DOL) can be defined as:
DOL = pjglvj-gC (1)
where: P = market price per unit of product
V = variable cost per unit of product
Q = total quantity of goods sold
FC = total fixed cost
Based upon the break-even formula, DOL can be rewritten as:
" Q
FC
where Q* = y=V is the break-even point. Equations (I) and (2) indicate that the
magnitude of DOL is essentially determined by the percentage of idle capacity. If
firm A's DOL is higher than the DOL of firm B, this implies that the percentage
of profit increase from a one percent Increase of net sales for firm A will be
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higher than that of firm B. However, if the operating and financing conditions
are the same for both firms A and B, then the above-mentioned difference is
essentially caused by firm A having a higher percentage of unutilized capacity.
In a sense, a high percentage of unutilized capacity implies high capital labor
ratio.
Averch and Johnson (1962) have investigated the behavior of the firm under
regulatory constraint. Using profit maximization as the motivation, they argue
that regulation will generally encourage a firm to employ a more capital intenr
slve production process. In this study, the DOL's of firms operating in differ-
ent regulatory regimes were used to test whether different degree of regulation
Induce an electric utility firm to maintain different levels of idle plant
6
capacity.
DOL's were calculated for fifty-nine firms during 1958-1975. Analysis of
variance statistical technique was used to test whether the DOL's for firms
operating in fair value, original cost, and reproduction cost regulatory regimes
were significantly different.
The F values listed in Table 1 reveal that the DOL's are significantly differ-
ent among different regulation regimes at the 5%, 10% or 15% significant leveX
for 14 out of 18 years. The average DOL (DOL) figure listed in Table 1 shows
that the DOL's associated with fair value valuation are always higher than those
of original cost regimes. This implies that firms under fair value regulation
would tend to maintain higher idle capacity than firms under original cost
jurisdictions. This may reflect a differential response to the Averch-Johnson
effect caused by differences in regulatory regimes. The rationale for this
behavior is rather straightforward. According to Averich and Johnson (1962),
regulation would encourage a firm to employ a more capital intensive process. Since
the fair value method causes the rate base to be higher than the original cost
method, the more liberal approach encourages even greater excess capacity than
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the original cost methods. The relationship of the average DOL of reproduction
cost with the other groups in less conclusive (see Table 1); perhaps, however,
a problem exists because of the small sample available for this class of firms
(only 6 firms)
.
Two different measures of leverage were used to investigate the impact of
different degrees of regulation on electric utility company's financing strategy
(or capital structure). Following Krainer (1977) and Miller and Modigliani
(1958, 1963) both the income statement and the balance sheet measures of lever-
age were used- to make this empirical test. The first leverage measure is defined
as total interest charges of firm i (Fi) divided to total returns for firm i (Xi)
iFi/Xl] ; the second leverage measure is defined as total book value of long-term
debt for firm i (Di) divided by total book value of asset (Ai) [~] . The analysis
of variance technique was again used to determine the extent of differences
in leverage among firms operating in the three different regulation regimes.
Table II reveals that there were really no differences in leverage among firms
operating in the three different regimes for all 18 years when the Di/Ai defini-
tion is used. However, if the Fi/Xi definition is used, there are significant
differences in the leverage among firms in three different regimes for 9 years.
It is appropriate to consider the relative advantages between the two different
definitions of leverage, 2i and ii.
Ai Xi
Miller and Moligliani (1958) defined leverage as the ratio between market
value of debt and market value of equity. In their 1963 AER paper, they argued
Fl 8
that yT can be used as an alternative leverage measure. It is clear that the
definition of -rr- is much closer than -^ to M & M's original theoretical concept
Fi
of leverage. Krainer (1977) discussed the advantage of using yj as leverage
measure. He considers Xi a more natural measure for bond holders since a going
concern's operating income, X, is the ultimate source for fulfilling the bond
contract. In addition, Krainer argued that over time changes in the interest
rate itself might be concealed in the debt-equity ratio.
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Table II also shows that the D/A Is very stable over time and the D/A's for
the electric utility firm are around forty-five percent. This figure is nearly
9
identical to the Bell System's optimal capital structure. In the parenthesis
associated with overall D/A is the D/A with current debt as part of total debt.
The results show that current debt of electric utility firms is approximately
2-3 percent. The relative stable D/A over time can be used to explain parts
of Krainer's (1977) findings and explain the dynamic relationship between the
Interest rate and capital structure. Table IV shows that firms, except for 1975,
with original cost regulation regimes have the highest y^, and the y^-' s associated
with fair value regimes is higher than those of firms with replacement cost
regimes for 12 out of 18 years. If interest charges are similar for all three
Fi
regimes then the different ^ may well be because regulation for reproduction cost
regime^ is more liberal than that of firms under either original cost or fair
value regimes; and the regulation for fair value is more liberal than that
of original cost regimes, as found by Peterson (1976). Finally, it is worth noting
Fl
that the j^ are increasing over time. This tendency may be because the interest
rates faced by the electric utility companies are increasing over time; interestingly,
even the
-^ is stable over time (see Table III). This may imply that the financial
risk for firms in the utility industry is generally increasing over time. Inciden-
tally, data show that most of the long term debt of the utility industry is
mortgage debt. However, the implication of mortgage debt (secured debt) optimal
capital structure and bankruptcy risk has been explored by Scott (1977).
The analyses of this section reveal that the different degrees of regulation,
as reflected by the different regulatory regimes, do cause some adjustments by electric
utility firms to their operating and financing strategy. This conclusion can be
used to explain Boness and Frankfurter's findings about the heteroscedastic na-
tiire of utility firms within the utility industry. Miller and Modigllani's (1966)
sample used by Boness and Frankfurter are listed in appendix C. The regulation
regime associated with each firm is also indicated. This classification shows
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that there exists at least three different regulatory regimes faced by M & M's
sample firms. Some firms in M & M's and our sample produced both electricity
and natural gas. From the market power theory developed by Hurdle (1975), it
can be argued that firms producing both electricity and natural gas will have
market power to generate more profit than those firms selling only one of these
products. This is an additional reason for Boness and Frankfurter's findings;
market power differences make firms dissimilar, even if they are in the same
industry.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that different degrees of regulation do affect electric
utility firm's operating and financing strategies. The degree of operating lever-
age measure Is used as an index of operating strategy; both balance sheet and
Income statement leverage ratios were used as indices of financing strategy. The
results of this analysis were also used to explain Boness and Frankfurter's
findings concerning the heteroscedastic nature of utility firms within the utility
industry.
This study also provides a potential approach for testing the Averch-Johnson
effect using financial infonnation which has been neglected until this time.
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TABLE I
Average DOL and the F values
DOL F statistics
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 2.3325 2.2463 2.4472 2.3867 2.8179*
1959 2.2922 2.2213 2.3988 2.3574 2.7447*
1960 2.2804 2.2020 2.3856 2.3910 2.9418*
1961 2.2867 2.2001 2.3996 2.4169 3.1125**
1962 2.2665 2.1998 2.3627 2.3389 1.6630
1963 2.2517 2.1683 2.3848 2.3027 2.7558*
1964 2.2274 2.1385 2.3682 2.2852 3.3436**
1965 2.1757 2.0935 2.2982 2.2538 3.2999**
1966 2.1299 2.0569 2.2185 2.2633 2.8257*
1967 2.0967 2.0343 2.1682 2.2241 2.0121*-
1968 2.1063 2.0414 2.1796 2.2426 2.2828*-
1969 2.0569 1.9945 2.1414 2.1427 2.1569*-
1970 1.9864 1.9458 2.0635 1.9729 1.3475
1971 1.9776 1.9515 2.0414 1.9237 .8723
1972 1.9643 1.9294 2.0608 1.8567 2.2110*-
1973 1.9717 1.9493 2.0685 1.7920 2.4049*
1974 1.9512 1.9239 2.0613 1.7570 1.9150
1975 1.9716 1.9499 2.0851 1.7343 2.6945""
** significant at 5% level
* Significant at 10% level
*- Significant at 15% level
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Table II
Fi
Average Value of ttt and the F statistics
(Fi/XiL) F statistics
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 17.34% 17.90% 16.53% 16.77% .5270
1959 17.03 17.59 16.42 15.77 .4317
1960 16.98 17.38 16.89 14.97 .6248
1961 17.29 18.12 16.67 14.54 2.6380*
1962 17.02 17.80 16.43 14.42 2.3609*
1963 16.94 17.58 16.76 • 13.90 1.9551*-
1964 16.88 17.68 16.59 13.23 2.4940*
1965 17.16 18.26 16.72 12.32 3.7811**
1966 17.91 19.09 17.65 12.02 5.3705**
1967 19.75 20.78 19.89 13.38 4.8172*
1968 21.50 22.50 21.64 15.40 3.0557*
1969 24.87 25.70 24.98 19.80 1.5019
1970 30.50 31.91 28.95 27.44 .8227
1971 33.74 35.99 29.95 32.97 1.6098
1972 33.27 34.42 31.44 32.53 .7418
1973 36.11 37.36 34.01 35.71 .6184
1974 42.86 43.53 39.45 49.82 1.7330
1975 38.12 39.02
.
34.80 43.55 1.9969**-
**: significant at 5% level
*: significant at 10% level
*-: significant at 15% level
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Table III
Average value of — and the F statistics
D
A F statistics
Overall Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
1958 45.60 (47.29) 45.72 45.98 43.71 .5255
1959 45,09 (47.06) 45.01 45.76 43.42 .8313
1960 44.89 (46.43) 45.01 44.90 44.19 .1004
1961 45.22 (47.04) 45.43 45.61 42.83 1.0352
1962 44.33 (45.65) 44.32 44.56 43.69 .0917
1963 43.71 (45.50 43.34 44.45 43.42 .2870
1964 43.30 (45.39) 43.19 43.73 42.53 .1691
1965 42.97 (45.60) 43.21 43.07 41.28 .4060
1966 43.41 (46.95) 43.47 44.40 39.97 1.3751
1967 43.86 (48.14) 43.30 45.25 42.67 .6495
1968 44.74 (49.68) 44.85 45.75 40.95 1.3953
1969 44.84 (50.70) 45.09 45.10 42.65 .4807
1970 46.76 (51.29) 46.28 47.10 48.40 .7256
1971 46.79 (51.09) 46.74 46.97 46.51 .0480
1972 45.55 (50.33) 45.07 46.41 45.48 .6324
1973 44.80 (49.81) 44.35 45.14 46.34 .6162
1974 42.66 (46.53) 43.25 42.73 43.00 .3595
1975 43.75 (48.19) 44.01 43.03 44.54 .5897
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APPENDIX A
Firms Included in the Sample
(According to Rate Base Method)
Original Cost
Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Central Main Power Co.
Concord Electric Co.
Consolidated Edison Co.
Green Mountain Power Corp.
Long Island Lighting Co.
Maine Public Service
New York State Electric & Gas
Niagra Mohawk Power Corp.
Orange & Rockland Utilities
Pacific Gas & Electric
Public Service Co. of Colorado
Rochester Gas & Electric
San Diego Gas & Electric
Southern California Edison
United Illuminating Co.
Boston Edison Co.
Central Louisiana Electric Co.
Consumer's Power Co.
Detroit Edison Co.
Edison Sault Electric Co.
Fitchburg Gas & Electric
Florida Power & Light
Florida Power Corp.
Hawaiian Electric Co.
Kansas Gas & Electric
Kansas Power & Light
Madison Gas & Electric
Savannah Electric & Power Co.
Tampa Electric
Upper Penninsula Power Co.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
Wisconsin Power & Light
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APPENDIX A
(continued)
Fair Value
Arizona Public Service Co.
Duquesne Light Co.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Tucson Gas & Electric Co.
Atlantic City Electric Co.
Central Illinois Light Co.
Central Illinois Public Service Co.
Commonwealth Edison Co.
Illinois Power
Indianapolis Power & Light Co.
Louisville Gas & Electric Co.
Missouri Utilities Co.
Philadelphia Electric Co.
Public Service Co. of Indiana
Public Service Co. of New Mexico
St. Joseph Light & Power
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co.
UGI Corporation
Reproduction Cost
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. Dayton Power & Light
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. Ohio Edison
Columbus Southern Ohio Electric Co. Toledo Edison

17,
Appendix or Data Summary
1. Total operating revenue for firm i = PQi; data obtained Moody's Public
Utility Manual [MPUM]
.
2. Total variable cost for firm i = VQi; data obtained from MPUM.
3. Total fixed cost for fimn 1 = Di; data obtained from MPUM.
4. Total returns for firm i = Xi; this variable was defined to be net
operating revenues plus taxes. Data from MPUM.
5. Total interest charges for firm 1 = Fi. It was defined to be interest
or long-term debt plus other interest charges. Data from MPUM.
6. Total long-term debt (or total debt) of flirm i = Di. The book value of
long-term debt (or total debt) for firm 1. Data obtained from MPUM.
7. Total assets for firm 1 = Ai. The hoolf. value of assets for firm 1.
Data obtained from MPUM.
8. Rate base methods were validated by referring to 5 different sources
to asure that the correct rate base method was used in this study.
This information was obtained from Eiteman (1962), Pike (1967),
Phillips (1969), and Senate Document No. 56, 90th Congress 1st Session
State Utility Commissions Sumnary and Tabulation of Information Sub-
mitted by the Commissions , and State of Arizona, Arizona Corporation
Commission Annual Report (1970).
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FOOTNOTES
Rates of return are generally determined by fhe cost of capital. See
Peterson (1976) for details. The regulatory process specifies relevant costs
and expenses which may be recovered by the utility firm as services are priced
to the buyer. The revenue requirement, that is the revenue that the utility is
authorized to collect, may be defined as follows. See Garfield and Lovejoy
(196A, p. 44).
(1) Reyenue Requirement = cost of service
(2) RR=E+d+T+ (V-D)R
where: RR = revenue requirement
E = operating expense
d = depreciation expense
T = taxes
V = gross valuation of the property serving the public
D = accrued depreciation
R = rate of return (a percentage)
(V-D) = rate base (net valuation)
(V-D)R = return amount, or earnings allowed on the rate. base.
2
These results are expected from theory and confirmed by Eiteman (1962,
p. 39).
3
This effect is consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1958, pp. 261-97).
4
Figure 1 adapted from Hurdle (1974, p. 479). In analyzing leverage,
diversification and capital market effects on risk-adjusted capital budgeting,
Tuttle and Litzenberger (1968, pp. 428-29) have argued that the firm does have
the option of neutralizing the risk inherent in a given investment opportunity
through long-term borrowing or lending.
In Tables I-III, group 1 = original cost regime; group 2 = fair value regime,
and group 3 = reproduction cost regime.
As the DOL is derived from the concepts of cost-volume-profit (CVP) and
Break-even analyses and the CVP and Break-even analyses are concerned with short-
run analyses. However, the AJ type analysis is based upon long-run analysis.
Adar, Barnea, and Lev (1977) 's comprehensive CVP analysis has analyzed the
economic implications of CVP and break-even analyses.
Kite (1977) has shown that cost of capital need not decline with leverage
even in perfect capital markets and with default-fee debt. This finding may be
used to justify why differed regulation regimes affect the capital structure in
some years and not in other years.
g
They use this definition to show that the higher the marginal corporate
tax rate and degree of leverage, the smaller the variance in after tax revenue.
9
See Scanlon (1972) for detail.
A more liberal regulation will generally increase a firm's total returns.
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Firms Included from Modligliani and Miller Sample
as used by Boness and Frankfurter
(Classified by Rate Base Method)*
19.
Firms From Original Cost Jurisdictions
Boston Edison
Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Consolidated Edison
Consumers Power
Detroit Edison
Florida Power
Florida Power & Light
Idaho Power
Kansas Gas & Electric
Montana Bakota Utility
N.Y. State Electric & Gas
Niagara Mohawk Power
Oklahoma Gas & Electric
Pacific Gas & Electric
Public Service of Colorado
Rochester Gas & Electric
San Diego Gas & Electric
South Carolina Electric & Gas
Southern California Edison
Utah Power & Light
Virginia Electric & Power
Wisconsin Electric Power
Firms. From Fair VaLue Jurisdictions
Atlantic City Electric
Carolina Power & Light
Central Illinois Light**
Central Illinois Public Service**
Commonwealth Edison
Duke Power
Illinois Power**
Indianapolis Power & Light
Kansas City Power & Light
Louisville Gas & Electric
Pennsylvania Power & Light
Philadelphia Electric
Public Service of Indiana
Duquesne Light Co.
Public Service Electric & Gas
.-1
20.
Firms Included from Modligliani and Miller Sample
as used by Boness and Frankfurter
(Continued)
Firms From Reproduction Cost Jurisdictions
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Dayton Power & Light
Cleveland Electric Ohio Edison
Columbus & S. Ohio Electric Toledo Edison
*Texas companies are not listed because, in that state, utilities are re-
gulated at the local levels and no state regulation exists. Other firms were
not included if the rate base method in their state could not be established
without ambiguity.
=^
**Illinois firms are classified as fair value firms even though that state
used original cost methods since March 13, 1973. This procedure was followed
because the interval is rather short and it is unlikely that substantial modifi-
cations occurred since the change.
*..<
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